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In this paper we show how an upstream firm can prevent destructive competition among 
downstream firms producing relatively close substitutes by implementing a price-dependent 
profit-sharing rule. The rule also ensures that the downstream firms undertake investments 
which benefit the industry in aggregate. The model is consistent with observations from the 
market for content commodities distributed by mobile networks. 
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The Bertrand paradox may provide a plausible explanation why the majority of the
content commodities on the Internet are oﬀered for free (marginal costs). The rival
is just “one click away”, and competing content providers have strong incentives to
undercut each other as long as there are positive proﬁt margins. In contrast, we
observe that prices for mobile phone content commodities like ring tones, football
goal alerts and jokes are well above marginal costs (the sales value of such services in
Norway in 2006 was twice as high as the total value of Internet ads). One potential
explanation why the Bertrand paradox is not observed for such goods, is the price-
dependent proﬁt-sharing rule used by some upstream mobile access providers. The
rule implies that the upstream ﬁrms charge a share of the end-user price per unit
of content instead of for instance a unit wholesale price from the content providers.
T h ec r u c i a lf e a t u r eo ft h i sr u l ei st h a tt h es h a r ea c c r u i n gt oag i v e nc o n t e n tp r o v i d e r
is increasing in the end-user price. The table below shows the proﬁt-sharing rule
used by the dominant Norwegian mobile operator Telenor; if a content provider sells
his good for 1 NOK he receives 45 % of the revenue, while he receives 80 % if he
sells the good for 70 NOK.1
End-user price (NOK) 1.0 1.5 3 5 10 20 70
Share to the content provider 45% 54.% 62% 66% 68% 70% 80%
In the formal model we consider an upstream ﬁrm selling an input (access) to
downstream ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated services. The upstream ﬁrm determines
the access conditions, while the downstream ﬁrms decide end-user prices and in-
vestments in for instance marketing. We show that by using a price-dependent
proﬁt-sharing rule, the upstream ﬁrm induces the retailers to behave as if demand
has become less price elastic. A price-dependent proﬁt-sharing rule is suﬃcient to
1In addition to this revenue-sharing rule, the content providers are charged a ﬁxed fee (but no
unit wholesale price). Strand (2004) emphasizes that the revenue-sharing scheme creates incentives
to promote new services. The Norwegian business model is now widely taken up in Europe and
Asia (Strand, 2004).
1achieve the vertical integration outcome also in presence of investment spillovers. A
ﬁxed fee determines the allocation of the total industry proﬁt.
The upstream ﬁrm could alternatively use a combination of resale price main-
tenance (RPM), a ﬁxed fee and a wholesale price below marginal costs to achieve
the vertical integration outcome (see Mathewson and Winter, 1984). The Bertrand
paradox is then avoided by indirectly limiting the retailers’ strategy choices. The
novelty in the above proposal is that the sharing-scheme reduces the undercutting
incentives among retailers directly by reducing the perceived price elasticity, and is
less likely to raise anti-trust concerns compared to RPM .2
2T h e M o d e l
We consider an upstream ﬁrm selling an input to n downstream ﬁrms. The demand
curve faced by downstream ﬁrm i =1 ,...,n is given by qi = qi(p), where p is the
vector of prices charged by the n downstream ﬁrms. We assume that the demand
functions are well behaved and downward sloping in own price (∂qi/∂pi < 0). The
consumers perceive the goods sold by the downstream ﬁrms as imperfect substitutes
(∂qi/∂pj > 0).
Marginal costs both at the upstream and downstream levels are set equal to zero;
however, this does not matter for the qualitative results. Hence, we can write total





Below, we consider a two-stage game where the upstream ﬁrm at stage 1 deter-
mines the conditions for access to the upstream good, and where the downstream
ﬁrms subsequently compete in prices. In Section 3 we extend the model by allowing
the downstream ﬁrms to make market-expanding investments.
2Moreover, with RPM the retail prices are not decided by the players with hands on market
experience. This may obviously be detrimental to the total channel outcome.
2The upstream ﬁrm uses a two-part tariﬀ, consisting of a ﬁxed fee F and a proﬁt-
sharing rule. We specify the proﬁt-sharing rule such that downstream ﬁrm i keeps a
share β(pi) of its operating proﬁt, while the upstream ﬁrm gets the share (1−β(pi)).
We later show that β
0(pi) > 0.3
Stage 2
The operating proﬁto fd o w n s t r e a mﬁrm i equals πi(p)=β(pi)piqi, and at the
last stage each downstream ﬁrm solves p∗




















i =0 . (2)
The second term in (2) would vanish if β were constant (β
0 =0 ), in which
case we would get the standard result that a proﬁt maximizing price ˆ pi satisﬁes
[ˆ qi +ˆ pi
∂qi
∂pi
]=0 . With β
0 > 0 t h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 )
is positive, implying that the marginal proﬁta ta n yg i v e np r i c ei sh i g h e rt h a ni f
β
0 =0 . This induces each of the downstream ﬁrms to behave less aggressively, and
we can state:
Proposition 1: The proﬁt-maximizing prices will be higher for β
0(pi) > 0 com-
pared to β
0(pi)=0 .





















Equation (3) characterizes the proﬁt-maximizing equilibrium price for ﬁrm i. It
is well known that revenue - and thus proﬁtf o raﬁrm facing zero marginal costs -
other things equal is maximized by choosing a price for which the elasticity is equal







i > 0,w es e ef r o m( 3 )t h a tt h ep r o ﬁts h a r i n g
rule induces the downstream service provider to behave as if the demand has become
less price elastic. This conﬁrms that the proﬁt-maximizing prices will be higher if
β
0 > 0 than if β
0 =0 :
3In contrast to the present paper, the literature on revenue-sharing as a vertical restraint con-
ventionally assumes that the revenue share is a constant; i.e. β
0 =0(see e.g. Lal, 1990).
3Proposition 2: Ap r o ﬁt-sharing rule β
0(pi) > 0 reduces the perceived elasticity
of demand for the downstream ﬁrms, making them behave less aggressively.
In the sequel we assume an isoelastic sharing rule so that βi(pi)=θpλ
i ,w h e r e
λ is the elasticity parameter determined by the upstream ﬁrm at stage 1 (for the
moment we treat θ as a positive scalar). With this speciﬁcation we can reformulate











ii = −(1 + λ) (5)
Stage 1
The upstream ﬁrm will use λ to induce the downstream ﬁrms to set the prices
that maximize total industry proﬁt. The ﬁxed fee F is then used as a proﬁtd i s t r i -
bution parameter. Thus, we ﬁrst derive the hypothetical equilibrium under vertical












=0 ( i =1 ,...,n). (6)
The term in the square bracket of (6) measures the marginal proﬁto ng o o di and is
analogous to the term in the square bracket of (2). The second term of (6) internal-









measure the increased demand for good j per unit reduction
in the demand for good i when pi increases. The higher these ratios, the higher pi
should be set in order to maximize aggregate industry proﬁt. The challenge for the
upstream ﬁrm in a vertically separated market structure is to set conditions inducing
the downstream ﬁrms to internalize this eﬀe c ta ts t a g e2 .
Inserting for ω
p












=0 . (i =1 ,...,n).










4The optimal value of λ ensures that aggregate proﬁt is the same in the verti-
cally separated market structure as in the hypothetical equilibrium with vertical
integration. This value can be found by using equations (4) and (7) and setting
q∗
i/p∗























ji =0 . The downstream ﬁrms thus choose prices such that ε∗
ii = −1, which is
optimal also from the industry’s point of view (λ
∗ =0 ) .H o w e v e r ,i ft h eg o o d sa r e
imperfect substitutes (such that
∂qj
∂pi
> 0), each downstream ﬁrm fully internalizes
the eﬀect its price has on the proﬁto ft h eo t h e rﬁrms when λ = λ
∗ > 0. Hence,
the downstream ﬁrms will not engage in destructive price competition even if they
produce close substitutes, and the Bertrand paradox is avoided:5
Proposition 3: The proﬁt-sharing rule βi(pi)=θpλ
i with λ = λ
∗ solves the
Bertrand paradox, and induces the downstream ﬁrms to maximize aggregate industry
proﬁt.
3 Market-expanding investments with spillovers
We now extend the model to allow each downstream ﬁrm to undertake market-
expanding (or quality-enhancing) investments with potential spillovers. At the out-
set, it is not clear how one ﬁrm’s investments aﬀect sales and proﬁts of the other
4Setting q∗
i /p∗
i = qVI/pVI uniquely determines the prices, since qi/pi is monotonically decreas-
ing in pi when ∂qi/∂pi < 0.
5As long as the horizontal pecuniary externality is the only problem to solve, we see from (8)
that the scalar θ has no impact on the outcome (but in absence of the ﬁx e df e ei tc o u l db eu s e da s
an instrument to allocate aggregate industry proﬁt).
5ﬁrms. The investing ﬁrm’s product will typically become relatively more attrac-
tive than those of the rivals. Thereby the latter could be harmed. However, there
might also be technological or marketing spillovers from an investment such that
one ﬁrm’s investment may be to the beneﬁt of all the downstream ﬁrms. A given
ﬁrm’s marketing of ring tones, for instance, is also likely to beneﬁt other ﬁrms selling
ring tone services. We thus open up for both positive and negative spillovers from
investments.
We assume that the downstream proﬁt function of ﬁrm i net of any ﬁxed fee is
given by
πi = β(pi)piqi(p,x) − φ(xi), (9)
where the new variable x denotes the vector of market-expanding investments un-
dertaken by the n downstream ﬁrms, and φ(xi) is the investment cost function. The
more a ﬁrm invests, the higher is the demand it faces; ∂qi/∂xi > 0. We assume that
φ
0(xi) > 0,a n dt h a ti ti ss u ﬃciently convex to satisfy all second-order conditions
for a proﬁtm a x i m u m .




[piqi(p,x) − φ(xi)]. (10)
The upstream ﬁrm determines the input conditions at stage 1, with θ and λ as
strategic variables, and at stage 2 the downstream ﬁrms decide non-cooperatively
on end-user prices and investment levels.
At stage 2 the ﬁrst-order condition ∂πi/∂pi =0is given by equation (4). Simul-












i is the proﬁt margin per unit sold.
To ﬁnd the optimal proﬁt-sharing rule at stage 1, we again use vertical integration











0(xi)( i =1 ,...,n). (12)
6If there were no investment spillovers the term ∂qj/∂xi w o u l di ng e n e r a lb en e g -
ative, and more so the closer horizontal substitutes the goods. This eﬀect, which
will not be taken into account by independent downstream ﬁrms, tends to generate
overinvestments in a decentralized market structure. However, if one ﬁrm’s invest-
ment increases demand also for its rivals, we have ∂qj/∂xi > 0. This is more likely
to be the case the poorer horizontal substitutes the goods are and the stronger the
investment spillovers.







.T h ev a r i a b l eωx
ji
measures the increase in demand for good j per unit change in the demand for good
i resulting from a higher investment by downstream ﬁrm i. With perfect spillovers
an investment by ﬁrm i beneﬁts all ﬁrms equally (∂qi/∂xi = ∂qj/∂xi > 0), and we
then have ωx
ji =1 . O t h e r w i s ew eh a v eωx
ji < 1 (and ωx
ji is negative if ∂qj/∂xi < 0 ∀i).
Imposing symmetry, we can now reformulate (12) as
pVI
£







The ﬁrst-order condition ∂Π/∂pi =0is given by equation (7), and thus λ
∗
in equation (8) still applies. Clearly, aggregate proﬁt is maximized also in the
decentralized market structure if it yields the same prices and investment levels as
under vertical integration. We can therefore use equations (11) and (13) to ﬁnd that
the upstream ﬁrm at stage 1 should set
θ = θ
∗ =





Abstracting from the distribution of the ﬁxed fee F, the downstream ﬁrms’ partici-
pation constraint requires that θ>0 (c.f. equation (9)). The range of permissible
values for θ
∗ is thus in the interval (0,n/p λ∗
VI]. In the extreme case where an invest-
ment by one downstream ﬁrm increases its demand by as much as the other ﬁrms
loose in sales (∂qi/∂xi = −(n − 1)∂qj/∂xi), the investment is a waste of resources
from the industry’s point of view. Then the upstream ﬁrm should set θ
∗ close to zero.
In the other extreme case, where we have perfect technological spillovers (ωx
ji =1 ),
we see that θ
∗ = n/pλ∗
VI. More generally, the upstream ﬁrm should specify a proﬁt-
sharing rule which gives each downstream ﬁrm a higher proﬁt margin, as captured
7by θ
∗, t h em o r eb e n e ﬁcial its investments are for its rivals.
We can state:
Proposition 4: The proﬁt-sharing rule βi(pi)=θpλ
i with λ = λ
∗ and θ =
θ
∗ yields the downstream ﬁrms pricing and investment incentives which maximize
industry proﬁt.
4 Concluding Remarks
A major problem in many network industries is that ﬁr m sm a ye n du pw i t hd e -
structive competition because they produce relatively close substitutes. This may
prevent the ﬁrms from undertaking investments which could beneﬁt the industry
in aggregate. Such an outcome can be avoided by implementing a proﬁt-shifting
rule which reduces the downstream ﬁrms’ perceived elasticity of demand. Optimal
investment levels are ensured by giving the downstream ﬁrms an appropriate proﬁt
margin that depends on how one ﬁrm’s investments aﬀect its rivals.
Another merit of our approach is that it is easy to implement when marginal costs
are low, since proﬁt sharing then approaches revenue sharing. A general limitation
of revenue sharing is the costs of monitoring the retailer’s revenue (Cachon and
Lariviere, 2005, and Dana and Spier, 2001). In the case at hand, this problem is
rarely signiﬁcant, since the upstream mobile provider collects the revenue from the
end users (but it is the content providers who decide end user prices).
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